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level factors including remittances parents expect from investing in education, parents perception 
of a child's desirable professions, cost of schooling and discount rate as significant determinants 
of parental school enrolment decision. When gender of the child and remittances are taken into 
account, we show male parents are more likely to invest in education of boys than girls because 
they expect significantly higher returns from their investment in boys. Female parents do not 
show such gender preference. The proportion of children enrolled in school is positively related 
to average cost of schooling for male parents Gender of parent plays a significant role in school 
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1. Introduction 
When Ghana gained independence in 1957, only 3.6% of the country’s population had 
formal education (UNESCO, 1958). The 1961 Population and Housing Census, which was the 
first comprehensive attempt to document socio-economic indicators in post-independence period, 
revealed great disparity in school enrolment between rural and urban areas of the country 
(Graham, 1971). Ghana experienced severe economic and political difficulties in late 1970s 
which resulted in a steep decline in productivity and living standards. Public spending on 
education and related services plummeted which had consequent effects on school enrolment that 
has persisted in rural areas over the decades. Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) estimate primary 
school enrolment in rural Ghana at 31% compared to about 77% in the country as a whole. 
Recent estimates in 2008 Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS08) put school enrolment at 
about 86.3% for the country but the figure is 54% in rural areas. In an attempt to address the gap 
in rural and urban school enrolment, a range of programmes have been implemented by 
governments over the years aimed at increasing school enrolment in rural communities.   They 
include construction of new school buildings in rural areas, Free Universal Primary Education, 
School Feeding Programme and Free School Uniforms programmes launched in 1980s to 
increase school enrolment. Direct costs of schooling to households which impose can impose 
financial burden on rural households and widen gender gap in access to education (Lucas and 
Mbiti, 2012). Policy measures which involve supplying school uniforms and books and waiving 
tuition fees can help reduce improve school enrolment.  
 However, policy policies tend to focus more on supply-side factors affecting 
school enrolment than demand-side factors which emanate within household level.  Demand-side 
measures are more important in rural communities where the opportunity cost of school 
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enrolment is higher due to a concentration of economic activities which make child labour 
remunerative. Parents receive returns in the current period by engaging them in a range of 
income generating activities such as supplying labour in the family enterprise (agriculture, 
mining, fishing, petty trading, etc), providing childcare for younger siblings, undertaking 
household chores or paid work outside the home to supplement household income (Dillon, 
2013). Consequently, school enrolment impose high cost on resource-poor households in rural 
because it involves the parent forgoing the opportunity to earn income from engaging children in 
income-generating  activities in the current period,  and incurring direct costs of schooling, in 
expectation of uncertain flow of remittances in the future. Therefore, measures to reduce rural 
parents’ dependence on labour supply from children and expectation of remittances such as rural 
social security system should be considered in addressing the problem of rural-urban divide in 
school enrolment. The growing youth unemployment in Ghana and in most SSA countries, lack 
of rural income insurance and social security indicates that rural parents’ consumption smoothing 
approach to education may provide an understanding of rural-urban in school enrolment.  
We posit that rural parents deal with the household resource allocation problem by 
enrolling a proportion of their children to school (expecting uncertain returns in the future) and 
keep a proportion at home to work (yield certain returns in the current period) to supplement 
household income. Felderer (1975) suggests rural parents see children as investment and 
consumption goods. However, human capital and familial dimensions to the problem makes it 
more complex than conventional portfolio allocation and capital budgeting decisions. Rural-
urban divide in school enrolment on educational and labour market prospects of children of rural 
residents is not limited to Ghana and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Fu and Ren (2010) notes that 
hukou (household registration) system in China ‘overwhelmingly suggests that individuals’ 
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human capital is largely determined by the place where they were born (i.e. rural or urban);   and 
the place they received compulsory education has cause educational inequality and ‘affects their 
labour-market return’ (p. 592). Moulden and Bradford (1984) used path analysis to show that the 
local resident environment or catchment area has significant influence on children’s educational 
attainment, especially for girls.  
We show that school decisions in rural Ghana are influenced by parent- and child-
specific factors including expectations of remittances (returns) from their investment, cost of 
schooling, gender of the child, age of the child, parent’s educational attainment, number of 
children in the household, parent’s discount rate, number spouses, land ownership and a host of 
other factors. The aim is to address the gap in the literature and provide policy makers with 
research evidence to address the rural-urban divide in school enrolment and human capital 
development. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the modelling 
framework and data collection. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results. And 
finally, section 4 supplies some concluding statements and policy recommendations.  
 
2. Modelling framework and data collection 
The neoclassical household behaviour model (a.k.a unitary model) contextualizes the 
basic framework of intra household decision making (Samuelson, 1956). The model assumes 
members of a household have a common utility function and behave as a single entity in taking 
economic decisions (Vermeulen, 2002). The intuition behind the unitary model is particularly 
useful for examining household decisions in rural Ghana. Households and communities in rural 
Ghana by tradition and culture commonly headed by unitary figures (often males) who make or 
sanction decisions on education, land tenure, marriage and crop production. Consequently, we 
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assume that unitary parent (heads of household) have homothetic preferences and maximize 
quasi-concave utility function in human capital investment subject to income and wealth 
constraints (Thomas, 1990). 
The parent allocates a proportion of his or her wealth, gained from current labour market 
activities, to current consumption and the rest is invested in education of children with the 
expectation of yielding returns in the form of remittances in the future as retirement income. In 
Haddad et al. (1997) examined the extent to which parents would forgo current consumption to 
allocate resources to children’s education. Becker (1994) notes that parental decision to invest in 
children’s human capital yields returns which would accrue not only to the children but also to 
parents in the form of transfers it generate in the future. 
 From the above, we can bifurcate the unitary parent's life into: child rearing stage when 
the parent is in the labour market, denoted by 1t  (Period 1) and retirement (old age) stage 2t   
(Period 2). The parent with no gender bias in relation to the children consumes composite goods 
1c and 2c  in periods 1 and 2 respectively. The household is endowed with wealth w  and N  
discrete number of children, of which the proportion   is kept at home to work to generate 
income to boost current consumption, and 1  proportion (with  0,1 ) sent to school as 
investment in human capital. The number of children N  is an exogenous positive integer because 
the emphasis is on human capital investment decisions not on fertility. If (1 ) 0,   that is, when 
parents send a child to school, they are faced with the decision to trade-off certain proportion of 
1c  for an uncertain 2c  including future remittances conditional on child securing employment in 
the future. Due to uncertainty in flow of returns (remittances) in the future, the parent may 
reduce the risk associated with enrolling children in school by discounting utility associated with 
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future remittances at the rate   (with 0  ) through increasing   to meet current consumption. 
Therefore, the household’s expected utility function from the schooling decision is:  
    2 21 2 1 1
( )
, ( )
1
u c
Eu c c u c

 

                                                (1) 
The utility function is assumed to be concave such that '
1 0u  ,
'
2 0u  ,
''
1 0u  ,
''
2 0,u   
' '
12 21 0u u  . Becker (1981) notes that intra household resource allocation approach involve 
present costs and future benefits. The household receives immediate current consumption 
boosting benefits from N  number of children kept at home, but incurs a cost of educating 
(1 )z N   children enrolled in school. Therefore, the functional form of current period benefit 
( )N  increases monotonically with number of children kept at home but decreases with 
number of children sent to school. However, the cost function ( )T z  increases with the number of 
children sent to school (i.e. z increases).  
For analytical convenience, we assume that the total benefit of educating children, z , is 
linear in the number of children sent to school  (where   is the marginal benefit per child). 
Given that the realization of the return (benefit) is probabilistic, we denote p  as the probability 
associated with return from investing in children's education and q as price of a composite good. 
Following standard consumer choice theory, q is assumed to increase at the rate of interest r.  
From the above, we can express the proportion of children enrolled in school as a linear function 
of vector of pertinent household and parent-specific variable:1      
                                               i i
   X                                                                    (2) 
                                                          
1 A full derivation of Equation (2) is supplied in the Appendix.  
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X is a matrix of explanatory variables including, but not limited to, the perceived probability of 
the child getting a job in the future, the discount rate (measure as the parent’s time preference), 
rewards parent expect to receive from children's education, the average cost of education, income 
of head of household, assets of parent, land ownership and the number of children in the 
household which influences school enrolment, and i  is a vector of normally distributed error 
terms. It is hypothesized a priori that 0  for all elements of X. 
 The data used in this study were obtained from a household surveys conducted between 
January to March 2012 in rural Ghana. We interviewed 800 heads of household but the sample 
was reduced to 720 due to missing values for several interviewees. In determining the sample 
size of this study, a multi-stage sampling was used. Firstly, geographical regions in the country 
were stratified into two broad strata: Northern and Southern strata. The Northern stratum consist 
of Upper West, Upper East, Northern, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti region; and the Southern 
stratum consists of the Volta, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra and Western regions. This was 
done to give each region a fair chance of representation. We used simple random sampling (SRS) 
technique to select two regions from each stratum. The SRS technique was further used to select 
two districts from each of the selected regions. Finally two villages were selected from each 
district to make a total of 16 communities, and 50 households were interviewed from each 
community. The questionnaire was divided into six sections requiring: socioeconomic and 
demographic information of the household, information of spouses, children in the household 
aged between 6-15 years, indication of wealth, household monthly expenditure and head of 
household’s attitude to risk. Most of the questions were short closed and few open ended which 
ensured that each questionnaire was delivered and collected by the research assistant in one visit.  
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3. Results and Discussion 
This section presents and discusses results of Equation (2) which was estimated using Baum et 
al. (2007) enhanced IV/GMM 2SLS regressions estimation routines. To examine the influence of 
gender of parent on decision- making, we ran separate regressions on sub-samples of male and 
female heads households and the full sample. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 contain empirical 
results of male and female headed households respectively, while Column 3 contains full sample 
results.  The cost of education is endogenous to systems and we found number of spouses as 
suitable instrumental variable for male headed household, and the number of male children per 
household was suitable instrument for the for female sample (Bound et al., 1995). The R-square 
shows that on average about 46% of total variation in the model are explained by the explanatory 
variables, and F-statistics and diagnostic tests confirm that the models are robust.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The results show that rewards parents expect from children's education have significantly 
positive effect on number of children parents enrol in school in rural Ghana. The null hypothesis 
that benefits from children’s education do not influence number of children parents enrol in 
school was rejected at 5 % level  for the full- sample and female headed households; and 1% and 
10% for boys and girls male headed of households respectively.  These findings confirm that 
remittances are significant determinants of the number of children enrolled in school in rural 
Ghana. A 10% increase benefits from children’s education increase would lead to 4% increase in 
school enrolment. Unlike female parents, the proportion of children enrolled in school by male 
parents is significantly related to the number of male children in the household. The full sample 
results show that proportion of children enrolled in the household is positively related to number 
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of male children but negatively related to number of female children. However, both coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. This result confirms the relationship between expected benefits and 
number of children enrolled in school found by Bennell (1996).  
The result further show that parents educational attainment is positive and statistically 
significantly related to number of children enrolled in school. Parents’ educational attainments 
significantly influence the number of children enrolled in school.  Previous studies show a 
positive link between parental education and school enrolment of children, especially for girls 
(Kambhampati and Pal 2001; Weir, 2007). Improvement in female education has been linked to 
family health and good home management (Lundborg et al., 2014). 
The probability of child getting desired jobs or going into desirable professions in the future is 
also statistically significant in explaining parents’ decision to invest in children’s education-- 
significant at 5%. The results show that the higher the parent’s perception of a child’s chances of 
getting the desirable jobs in future, the higher would be their investment in education. Parents’ 
investment in a child's education decrease as perceived probability of the child getting suitable 
jobs decreases. This implies that school enrolment would increase if they expect children to have 
favourable employment opportunities after schooling which they could benefit from. Dimova et 
al. (2010) show that job opportunities for highly-educated workers in West Africa tend to be 
limited to a relatively small formal sector jobs.  Foltz and Gajigo (2012) conclude that education 
is considered as an investment and parents invest in children’s education if the benefits exceed 
the cost. Earlier study by Mincer (1975) shows that differences in earnings reflect differences in 
returns to education between individuals. However, the results further indicate that male parents 
are more likely to consider a child's future career and job prospects in making school enrolment 
decisions than female headed households. In rural Ghana, men are generally employed in 
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farming, mining, fishing and related activities while women are housewives, petty traders or 
unemployed. In particular, majority of female headed households consist of women who were 
divorced or separated.  
The interaction of child gender with expected benefit and probability of securing desired 
jobs is included in the model examine gender biases in parents expectation of remittances and 
expectation children getting desirable jobs. The results confirm that benefits and probability of 
going into desirable professions are statistically significant determinants of parent’s decision to 
invest in education of children of both sexes. However, male parents strongly associate 
remittances with investment in sons’ education than daughters; while female do not distinguish 
between sons and daughters in terms of preference for remittance. Nonetheless, age of the child 
is a significant factor for female parents than male parents. The age of the child is not statistically 
significant for both boys and girls under male headed household, but statistically significant for 
female heads of households. This is because most rural women who are not formally employed 
use labour supply from girls to assist them in house work, childcare and small scale economic 
activities to supplement the household income. Consequently, as children grow older, the 
opportunity cost of sending the child to school become higher with female headed household. 
The a priori expectation is that the average cost of education and the number of children 
parents enrol in schools are negatively related. However, our results show a statistically 
significant positive relationship between the average cost of education and the number of male 
children enrolled in school in the male sub-sample and the overall sample. These results are 
supported by GLSS08 report which shows that increasing numbers of children are enrolled in 
schools regardless of rising costs. These findings contradict Pritchett and Filmer (1999) 
conclusion that average cost of education is inversely related to the number of children enrolled 
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in school. The positive relationship between cost of education and number of children enrolled in 
rural Ghana could be due to intangible benefits associated with investment in children's 
education as well as policies geared towards increasing uptake of formal education. Moreover, 
parents select specific schools because they believe that those schools offer better education and 
enable their children to get good exam even though it costs them more.  
The discount rate variable is negatively related to the number of children enrolled in 
school but only statistically significant for male headed household. In theory, parents with higher 
discount rates are likely to enrol lower proportion of children to school than heads with lower 
discount rate for a given level expected benefit. The negative relationship indicates that rural 
parents consider children as both investment goods and consumption goods. The investment 
component is so strong that it outweighs the consumption component. Lang and Ruud (1986) 
show inverse relationship between discount rate and present consumption and investment in 
education. However, parents also derive intangible benefit from investing in their children’s 
education. For example, the community may accord higher respect and societal recognition to 
parents who enrol their children in school. Therefore parents may consider esteem factors and 
intangible benefits alongside tangible reward to their investment attached to educating their 
children. In addition, parents may invest in their children’s education because they consider it as 
part of their parental responsibility. Therefore, rural parents can allocate more resources to their 
children’s education than convention investment appraisal rules would suggest. Becker and 
Tomes (1994)) show that culture and societal influence also affect parents’ decision on human 
capital investment.   
 Household assets are positive and significant determinant of school enrolment. The null 
hypothesis that asset of household does not influence the proportion of children enrolled in 
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school was rejected at 5 and 10% for the combined sample and male sample respectively. 
Households with higher income have access to more resources to invest in the child’s education. 
Donkoh & Amikuzuno (2011) noted that household income is one of the main determinants of 
school enrolment. 
The size of land owned by the head of household was not statistically significant in 
explaining the decision to invest in children education but shows the expected negative sign. The 
inverse relationship between land ownership and school enrolment indicate that parents with 
large land would prefer more of their children to work on the land than enrol them in school and 
vice versa. Kenny et al. (1979) found that due a decline in labour supply requirements of children 
in farming activities, parents have increased the number of hours their children spend in school 
as a result of the benefits they expect to receive. The results shown in both regressions indicate 
that land ownership is not a significant factor in parents’ decisions about children’s education 
probably because they expect higher returns on education in modern times than from farming 
activities.  
   The gender specific coefficient in full-sample result indicates that the gender of the 
parent and child play significant role in parents’ decision to send their children to school. The 
results further shows that male headed households have access to greater resources than female 
headed households. This evidence is supported by findings of the GLSS08 which shows that 
more women in Ghana live below the poverty line than men.  
  
5. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
This study identified a number of factors including returns parents expect from children, 
future job prospects, household wealth, discount rate of parent, number of children in the 
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household, parents’ educational level, the age of the child and gender of the parent as key 
determinants of households’ decision to invest in education. Contrary to previous studies, our 
results show that average cost of schooling is positive rather than negatively related to school 
enrolment in rural Ghana. This could be due to intangible benefits parents associate with 
investing in education and quality parents associate with schools that charge higher fees.  
We offer the following recommendations to enable the government of Ghana to increase 
school enrolment in rural areas.  Firstly, government policies aimed at influencing the level of 
school enrolment should not concentrate only on supply-side issues because demand-side factors 
at household level are vital in school enrolment decisions. Therefore, government should create 
more job opportunities for school-leavers and graduates. For example, the National Youth 
Employment Programme must be expanded to employ more young people especially from rural 
areas. The lack of formal job opportunities coupled with demand for labour supply of children in 
family-owned businesses such as petty-trading, farming; fishing which do not need specialized 
skills, help to inflate the opportunity cost of schooling. Therefore, policies aimed at increasing 
job opportunities for the educated in the country can help to reduce the opportunity cost of 
investing in children’s education. Secondly, government should involve rural parents in 
formulation of educational policies. This could be done by organising focus group discussions at 
community level to know the expectations of parents before coming out with the policies. This is 
because parents’ expectations are likely to be taken into account if they are involved in decision 
making process. Finally, eliminating liquidity constraints can also have positive effects on 
children school enrolment. In particular, it would be possible to use microcredit programmes to 
enable parents, who are unable to procure loan because of lack of collateral, to acquire loans and 
this situation will encourage them to invest in their children’s education. 
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Table 1: Instrumental variable regression result on investment in education  
Dependent variable: Proportion of children enrol in school 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Variables Male headed 
household 
Female 
headed 
household 
Full sample 
Benefit from child education 0.21 0.523* 0.442 
Benefit from chid education (boy) 0.128*** 0.851** 3.312** 
Benefit from chid education (girl) 0.018* 0.016** 0.364** 
Number of boys 0.044* 0.434 0.012 
Number of girls 1.283 0.276 -0.02 
Parental education-Primary level 0.861*** 0.961 0.965** 
Secondary level 0.095** 0.173* 0.444** 
Tertiary level 0.017** 0.158*** 1.006*** 
Prob. Child get the desired job 0.056 0.712* 0.529 
Prob. Child get the  desired job(boy) 0.476** 0.665** 0.132** 
Prob. Child get the desired job(girl) 0.107** 0.097** 0.546** 
Child age 0.953 0.876 0.998 
Child age (boy)  0.226 0.087* 0.111 
Child age (girl) 2.771 0.231* 0.373 
Cost of educating a child 3.23*** -0.991  1.321*** 
Head of household discount rate -0.034* -0.401 -0.009 
Asset of head of household 0.431* 0.237 1.241** 
Monthly expenditure of head household 0.418 0.123 0.376 
Plot of Land -0.081 0.432 -0.562 
Male headed household     1.081*** 
Constant 5.314*** 3.004* 3.134** 
Observations 608 112 720 
R-squared 0.438 0.472 0.457 
F-statistics 74.16 67.83 53.99 
P>F 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic) 
29.968 11.342 7.238 
Underidentification (Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic) 
29.545 14.006 7.283 
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Appendix  
From the above, the expected net benefit of investing in a child's education, A, is 
specified as:                                                                                                                             
 
 
(1 )
(1 )
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 
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                                 (2)
 
Therefore, the household’s budget constraints is given by, 
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The corresponding Langragian function of the unitary parent's utility of schooling investment is: 
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A first order derivative of (3b) with respect to present and future consumption and the parent 
wealth would give us the optimum values of current consumption and endowment to invest in a 
child’s education, 
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We divide equation (4) by equation (5) 
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For further analytical convenience, we assume a linear utility function of the form ( ) lnu c c . In 
addition, the following functional forms are assumed:  . (1- )T v N , and  ( 
2
N)= αN . 
Consequently, equation (8) is rewritten as:  
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Using a specific functional form Equation (7) can be re-specified as 
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(10) 
Similarly, we can specific functional forms to re-specify Equation (6) as: 
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 Making   the subject of the relation from Equation (11), we have 
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Thus, 
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X is a matrix of explanatory variables consisting of determinants of school enrolment, and i  is 
a vector of normally distributed error terms. The empirical results of this paper are obtained from 
estimation of Equation (13). It is assumed a priori that ˆ 0   for , ,and  r p N and 
ˆ 0  for  and   .  
 
 
 
 
